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LESSONS FROM CALIFORNIA’S RECENT EXPERIENCE
WITH ITS NON-UNITARY (DIVIDED) EXECUTIVE: OF
MAYORS, GOVERNORS, CONTROLLERS, AND ATTORNEYS
GENERAL
Vikram David Amar∗
It is often said that one of the great advantages of a federalist system is that
states can operate as laboratories of democracy, experimenting with common
law and statutory frameworks in ways that provide useful policy information to
other states as well as the federal government.1 The utility of this framework is
not limited to the common law or experiments by legislatures; it applies with
equal, albeit underappreciated, force to matters of constitutional law.
Thus, in a symposium dedicated to examining the meaning and future of
the federal “unitary executive,” the experience of states—almost all of which
reject a unitary executive model—warrants some inquiry. Recent episodes in
the most populous state, California, involving struggles over two of the most
prominent and consuming controversies of our day—recognition of gay
marriage and how best to deal with unprecedented public budget shortfalls—
serve as the focus of my Essay. These episodes highlight both the pitfalls and
the possibilities of a divided (that is, plural) executive model.

∗ Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, University of California at Davis. Some
of the themes raised and arguments made in this Essay were first presented, in tentative and undeveloped form,
in various on-line columns the author wrote for the website findlaw.com. These on-line columns are viewable
on the author’s Findlaw archive page, which is available at http://writ.news.findlaw.com/amar.
1 However fairly, the “laboratory” metaphor for policy experimentation is often attributed to Justice
Louis Brandeis, who wrote that “[i]t is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single
courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic
experiments without risk to the rest of the country.” New State Ice Co. v. Leibmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting).

AMAR GALLEYSFINAL

470

5/3/2010 10:30 AM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 59

LESSON # 1: DISPERSAL OF CORE EXECUTIVE POWER CAN GENERATE DUBIOUS
AND ULTIMATELY HARMFUL CLAIMS OF POWER BY EXECUTIVE OFFICIALS IN
WAYS THAT INCREASE DISORDER AND CYNICISM DURING CRITICAL TIMES.

A. San Francisco Mayor Gavin Newsom and the Origins of California’s Gay
Marriage Saga
“California, like virtually every other state, employs a divided executive in
that [the] State Constitution divides the executive powers of state government
among several” actors, both horizontally at the state level and vertically within
the geographical subdivisions that comprise the state.2 The tensions and
disputes created by this allocation of authority arise most frequently between
various statewide constitutional officers, but the battles over gay marriage—
one of the biggest storylines in the state and the nation over the last decade—
demonstrate that the division of executive power between state officials on the
one hand and regional or county officials on the other generates its own
potential for mischief.
In the spring of 2004, in direct and overt defiance of state statutes limiting
state-sanctioned marriage to heterosexual couples,3 Gavin Newsom, the mayor
of San Francisco (both a county and a city) began directing the Clerk of San
Francisco County to make whatever changes were necessary “in order to
provide marriage licenses on a non-discriminatory basis, without regard to
gender or sexual orientation.”4 Newsom took this position based on his view
that state and federal equal protection and due process principles required it.5
Under Newsom’s direction, the county issued licenses to thousands of samesex couples whose weddings were performed at city hall by county bureaucrats
and elected officials.6
The issuance of these licenses quickly prompted a number of lawsuits
brought by private groups seeking to enforce California state statutes
forbidding same-sex marriage.7 California trial courts declined to grant the
immediate injunctive relief sought by the private plaintiffs,8 largely on the
2

Gilb v. Chiang, No. 34-2008-80000026, at 8 (Cal. App. Dep’t 29 Super. Ct. Mar. 18, 2009).
See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 308.5 (West 2009) (providing that “[o]nly marriage between a man and a
woman is valid or recognized in California”), invalidated by In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008).
4 Lockyer v. City and County of S.F., 95 P.3d 459, 464 (Cal. 2004).
5 See id. at 464–65, 465 n.4.
6 Id. at 465.
7 E.g., id. at 465–66.
8 E.g., id. at 466.
3
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ground that even if Mayor Newsom had been improperly violating state law,
the plaintiffs would not suffer substantial “irreparable injury” because of it.9
A few days later, California Attorney General Bill Lockyer filed papers
directly with the California Supreme Court, making three requests: (1) that the
court issue an immediate cease-and-desist order directing the county clerk to
stop issuing new licenses; (2) that the court declare the marriages that had
already been performed invalid based on allegedly illegal actions of the mayor;
and (3) that the court take up and resolve the question of whether, as advocates
of same-sex marriage like Newsom had argued, California’s constitution
prohibits discrimination against same-sex couples in the context of marriage.10
Mayor Newsom’s only imaginable defense for his actions was his stated
belief that the state statutes violated the California and federal constitutions
and that the oaths he swore when he took office permitted—perhaps even
compelled—him to disregard such statutes that conflict with these higher
laws.11
One specific provision of the California constitution posed a problem for
Mayor Newsom. Article III, Section 3.5 of the California constitution
admonishes that an “administrative agency . . . has no power . . . [to] refuse to
enforce a statute, on the basis of it being unconstitutional unless an appellate
court has made a determination that such statute is unconstitutional.”12
Section 3.5 appears to have been added to the state constitution to provide
an orderly judicial process to resolve questions about the constitutionality of
state laws. It essentially directs state agency officials who believe a statute is
unconstitutional to obey the statute until appellate courts have decided the
constitutional question, rather than disregard the will of the legislature in the
name of constitutional conscience.13

9 See, e.g., Thomasson v. Newsom, No.CGC-04-428794, at 1 (Cal. Super. Ct. County of S.F. Feb. 25,
2004) (order denying temporary restraining order).
10 Lockyer v. City and County of S.F., 95 P.3d 459, 466 (Cal. 2004). The attorney general noted that the
court could choose to grant the cease-and-desist order and invalidate the marriages already performed, but then
allow lower courts to decide the state constitutional equal protection and due process issues even before they
were addressed by the state supreme court. But the attorney general indicated that it was his belief that the
better course was for the court to examine the merits right away, without waiting for the lower courts to rule,
insofar as the due process and equal protection questions were adequately framed and presented. Id.
11 See supra notes 3–5 and accompanying text (discussing Mayor Newsom’s decision to issue thousands
of marriage licenses to same-sex couples).
12 CAL. CONST. art. III, § 3.5.
13 See id.
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Attorney General Lockyer relied heavily on Section 3.5 in his request for
an immediate cease-and-desist order,14 and his argument seemed to have the
force of the law behind it. Even if state statutes banning same-sex marriage
did violate state due process or equal protection principles, Section 3.5 on its
face appeared to preclude the mayor from disregarding these statutes in the
absence of invalidation by a state appellate court.
Indeed, the only real question concerning the applicability of Section 3.5 in
the minds of many observers was whether San Francisco is an “administrative
agency” within the meaning of this section. The better view is that San
Francisco is an “agency” for these purposes. It was, after all, the San
Francisco county clerk who issued the licenses,15 and the state constitution
elsewhere defines “counties” as “legal subdivisions of the state.”16 A
prominent treatise on the California constitution summarizes the prevailing
view that counties “serve as regional agencies and instrumentalities of some
state-level functions and are thus treated as legal and operational subdivisions
of the state government itself.”17
If one moves beyond the text of Section 3.5 to its evident purposes, the
actions of San Francisco officials in the same-sex marriage context are hard to
justify. The licenses each county grants are valid not just in that county, but
rather throughout the state and perhaps in other states as well.18 Thus, the
desire to avoid disorder and confusion that underpins Section 3.5 is implicated
in a significant way by the issuance of marriage licenses.
This is not to say that Section 3.5’s approach to the problem of what
executive branch agencies should do when they think a statute is
unconstitutional—namely, enforce the statute until an appellate court acts—is
the only reasonable answer. To be sure, disagreements that arise within an
executive branch as to whether an action is constitutional must be settled
through some process. In the federal system, the President usually has the last
word, and sometimes the President’s word need not even agree with that of the
courts. But all others within the Executive Branch must fall in line with the
President—an agency head (despite his or her oath to uphold the Constitution)
14

See Lockyer, 95 P.3d at 466.
Id. at 465.
16 CAL. CONST. art XI, § 1.
17 JOSEPH R. GRODIN, CALVIN R. MASSEY & RICHARD B. CUNNINGHAM, THE CALIFORNIA STATE
CONSTITUTION: A REFERENCE GUIDE 182 (11th ed. 1993).
18 Whether the marriage licenses are valid in other states depends on the states’ interpretations of the
federal Constitution’s Full Faith and Credit Clause. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
15
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cannot contravene the President’s position. For example, a regional EPA
official or a regional federal prosecutor could not, relying on his oath, defy the
President’s directive to enforce a federal statute that the official believes is
unconstitutional. Such localized authority would be intolerably chaotic and
inefficient, with regional agency representatives frustrating the public’s
expectations by refusing to follow decrees from Washington.
If the federal system can opt in this way for a “unitary executive,” states
certainly can as well. One way of understanding Section 3.5 is that California
has embraced at least some aspects of the federal model in this respect; the
California constitution and cases recognize the Governor and attorney general
as the state’s chief law enforcement officers, and Section 3.5 does not allow
lesser state agencies to diverge from the positions taken by these state
executive leaders, at least until an appellate court has directed them to do so.
Thus, just as at the federal level regional representatives and agency heads
must fall in line with the President, Section 3.5 suggests that at the state level
mayors must fall in line with the Governor when it comes to law
enforcement.19 Whether a Governor or an attorney general could have a decent
claim to be free from the constraints of Section 3.5 because they are not
“agencies” (just as the President might claim a right to disregard congressional
enactments that he believes are unconstitutional regardless of what an appellate
court has said),20 a lower-level state executive official, like a mayor, simply
cannot make such a claim.
Cities in California (and other states) do enjoy some state constitutional
protection to decide for themselves certain local matters free from state
control.21 But the California constitution understandably limits these local
autonomy realms to “municipal affairs.”22 “Municipal affairs” are understood
to include things such as setting salaries for city employees, contracting for
city construction projects, taxing local residents, and the like.23 But because of
the significant intra- and interstate implications of marriage, the issuance of
marriage licenses does not fall within the “municipal affairs” category. Instead
it is part of a uniform statewide administrative scheme.

19
20
21
22
23

See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 51–68 and accompanying text.
See CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 5.
Id. See also GRODIN, MASSEY & CUNNINGHAM, supra note 17, at 187–90.
See CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 5.
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This becomes clear if we consider how the system would have reacted if
Mayor Newsom’s objections to state statutes concerning marriage had been
based not on a perceived conflict with the California constitution, but rather
only on his policy sense of what types of marriage ought to be recognized.
Suppose, for example, that a California mayor sincerely believed that persons
who are fourteen years old should be allowed to marry (in violation of state
law) but grounded his argument on policy views rather than on an
interpretation of state constitutional principles? No one would ever think that a
mayor and a city could go with their own policy views based on local powers
over “municipal affairs.”
Possibly because they sensed some weakness in their position for the
reasons just discussed, Mayor Newsom and his lawyers eventually asserted
that state statutes prohibiting same-sex marriage might violate the federal, as
well as the state, Constitution, and that this changed things.24 In essence,
Newsom’s lawyers argued that Section 3.5 would violate federal constitutional
supremacy25 if it were invoked to require a state official to do something he
believed violated federal law.26
Although it was an interesting argument, upon reflection I reject the
position taken by Newsom’s lawyers. Whenever a genuine disagreement
arises between the institutional actors within the state as to the legality of a
state statute and there exists a good-faith belief that the statute might, in the
end, be upheld, nothing in the federal Constitution prohibits a state from
setting forth an orderly process to administer a state law that ultimately might
be invalidated as violating the federal Constitution. If a situation arose in
which a state constitution directed state officials to enforce laws that all
reasonable persons would agree, based on clearly settled law, run afoul of the
federal Constitution, a federal due process problem might very well arise. But
that is not what Section 3.5 asks of mayors and other state agencies. Instead, it
directs that, when reasonable people could disagree about how a state or
federal constitutional challenge will be resolved by the judiciary, agencies
should wait for a court of appeals decision on the relevant issue before
declining to implement the will of the legislature as expressed in the statute.27

24

See Lockyer v. City and County of S.F., 95 P.3d 459, 467 (Cal. 2004).
See U.S. CONST. art. VI (“This Constitution . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land. . . any Thing in
the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.”).
26 See Lockyer, 95 P.3d at 467.
27 See CAL. CONST. art. III, § 3.5.
25
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For example, under the argument I make here, the situation would have
been different if the U.S. Supreme Court had already held, in a case from
another state, that the federal Equal Protection Clause requires that same-sex
couples have equal access to marriage. If, in that situation, Governor Arnold
Schwarzenegger had issued a directive telling local officials to continue
honoring heterosexual but not homosexual marriages, that directive could be
ignored by state agencies, notwithstanding Section 3.5 of the state constitution.
Under such circumstances, the state would not have been able to defend its
attempts to compel mayors to comply with the directive on the ground of
promoting intra-executive stability and good order. It would have been plain
that instead of seeking intra-executive stability, the state was simply trying to
frustrate federal rights and nothing more. Such obvious intent to disregard
federal rights might directly violate the federal Supremacy and Due Process
Clauses.
But so long as measures like Section 3.5 are understood to apply only to
situations in which a reasonable person could argue that the state statute in
question does not violate the federal Constitution, there is no federal bar to
requiring state agencies to implement a state statute unless and until an
appellate court invalidates it.28 For these reasons, San Francisco needed an
appellate court decision in its favor before granting licenses for same-sex
marriages. And no appellate court had ruled on California’s heterosexual-only
marriage statutes at the time of Mayor Newsom’s actions. Thus, Section 3.5
suggests San Francisco should have enforced the marriage laws, as they then
existed, until an appellate court had ruled on them.
The California Supreme Court promptly saw problems with the mayor’s
actions. Within days of receiving the attorney general’s request, the court
enjoined San Francisco officials from issuing any more same-sex marriage
licenses—but only after thousands of same-sex couples had been granted
licenses.29 Halting further issuance of the licenses, the court asked for briefing
on the narrow question of whether a mayor has the power to decline to follow
state marriage statutes when he believes the statutes to be unconstitutional.30
The overwhelming majority of informed analysts correctly predicted that
the mayor’s actions would be unanimously rebuffed by the California high

28
29
30

Id.
Lockyer, 95 P.3d at 467.
Id.
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court.31 And yet, the mayor’s actions caused tremendous confusion and
instability as to the administration of the state marriage regime and the validity
of marriage licenses already issued. It is possible that many years from now,
people might look back on the episode and argue that, as a political matter,
Mayor Newsom’s actions kicked off a sequence of events that, either through
federal litigation or a ballot measure, ultimately ended up guaranteeing
marriage rights for same-sex couples in California. But without the benefit of
a crystal ball predicting the future, I cannot help but conclude that the mayor’s
actions generated much undesirable disorder and disarray on a matter of
statewide concern. Further, the disorder he created was not confined to the
jurisdiction that elected him. The validity of the marriage licenses issued by
the County of San Francisco posed a quandary for officials and others
throughout the whole state.
This kind of disruption is a product of a very divided state executive
branch. Within the federal government, disagreements over the administration
of nationwide programs—for example, federal criminal laws or EPA or FAA
licensing schemes—are, or at least can easily be, resolved at a centralized
location within the Executive Branch. This means that various regions of the
country are subject to different enforcement regimes only to the extent that the
highest officials in the administration decide that having different rules in
different places is for some reason beneficial in the short run. In other words,
under the federal system, any temporary uncertainty or disorder would be a
product of deliberate choice in the moment—for which the President and his
advisors would be fully accountable—rather than a function of institutional
design.32 In short, the Gavin Newsom episode seems like “Exhibit A” for
those who argue that a unitary executive at the federal level promotes
coherence, stability, and political accountability for important executive
decisions.

31 See, e.g., Bob Egelko, Court Halts Gay Vows; SURPRISE RULING: Newsom Says the City Will Make
a Strong Case. State Justices Take S.F. Case on Narrow Constitutional Issue, Promise Quick Decision, S.F.
CHRON., Mar. 12, 2004, at A1.
32 See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 922 (1997) (noting the importance of unity in the Executive
Branch and invalidating Congress’s attempt, through the Brady Act, to transfer federal law enforcement
“responsibility to thousands of CLEOs in the 50 States, who are left to implement the program without
meaningful Presidential control”).
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B. The 2008–2009 (and Beyond?) Budget Battles in California Between
Arnold Schwarzenegger and John Chiang
Perhaps the only state news item that has rivaled same-sex marriage in
prominence in California headlines over the last few years is the massive,
unprecedented state budget fiasco that began in summer 2008. The causes of
the budget crisis are contested and manifold, but the magnitude of the
predicament was undeniable. Beginning in the summer of 2008, the state was
facing a yearly deficit of approximately $40 billion,33 a staggering amount for
an entity that is not authorized to borrow for yearly operating costs and that
had annual general fund revenues in the ballpark of $100 billion before the
recession.34
In response to this crisis, Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger undertook
many emergency measures designed to save the state multiple billions of
dollars a year. These measures included a plan to pay most state employees
only the federal minimum wage until after a state budget had been passed35 and
to “furlough” hundreds of thousands of state workers a few days each month.36
Managing an unprecedented fiscal crisis is difficult even for the most
functional of governments, but Republican Governor Schwarzenegger’s efforts
were hindered by many other state executive officials—most notably
California State Controller John Chiang, a Democrat. The Governor had to sue
the elected controller twice (and had to defend himself in a third action in
which the controller joined union plaintiffs suing the Governor)37 to get Chiang
to implement the directives that the Governor and his Department of Personnel
Administration had issued regarding temporarily reduced pay.
The arguments Controller Chiang asserted for refusing to abide by the
Governor’s edicts fell into three main categories. First, he argued that the

33

Jim Christie, UPDATE-2 California Delaying Tax Refunds Amid Cash Crisis, REUTERS, Jan. 16, 2009.
See, e.g., STATE OF CAL. DEP’T OF FIN., 2008–09 FINAL BUDGET SUMMARY, Sept. 23, 2008, available
at http://www.documents.dgs.ca.gov/osp/GovernorsBudget/pdf/fbudsum_0809.pdf.
35 See, e.g., Michael Rothfield, The State; Gov. Lays Off 10,000 Workers; Part-Timers Are Fired. Most
Others Would Get Minimum Wage. The Controller Vows to Block the Pay Cut., L.A. TIMES, Aug. 1, 2008, at
A1.
36 Id.
37 See Gilb v. Chiang, No. 34-2008-80000026 (Cal. App. Dep’t 29 Super. Ct. Apr. 13, 2009) (final
judgment); Prof’l Eng’rs in Cal. Gov’t v. Schwarzenegger, No. 34-2008-800000126-CU-WM-GDS (Cal.
Super. Ct. County of Sacramento Feb. 11, 2009) (judgment regarding verified petition); Schwarzenegger v.
Chiang, No. 34-2009-900000158-CU-WM-GDS (Cal. Super. Ct. County of Sacramento Feb. 10, 2009)
(minute order regarding notice of related cases).
34
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Governor’s fiscal plan was unwise, unnecessary (given state cash flow
projections), and practically unfeasible.38 Second, echoing the tack taken by
Mayor Newsom in San Francisco, he argued that the Governor’s proposed
course of action would violate federal employee wage laws and thus run afoul
of the Supremacy Clause.39 Finally, he argued that the Governor’s orders
trammeled his state constitutional independence to administer the payment of
state monies and to oversee his office, which the state constitution set up as
distinct from the Governor within the executive branch.40
To date, each of these arguments has been rejected by the courts in
thoughtful trial court opinions, as most observers had expected. However, the
cases are still winding their way up the appellate ladder, all the while
continuing to magnify the confusion and uncertainty of the budget “fixes”
currently in place.41 These cases also have the potential to shift significant
power during this episode to the members of the state judiciary, who might
have felt (and still feel) emboldened to second-guess the Governor’s plans
since the challenges to those plans come not just from employee labor unions
but also from statewide constitutional officeholders. As discussed below,42
there are particular reasons to think the controller’s legal assertions of
independence and discretion were (and still are) weak, but they were plausible
enough to have interjected additional tension and unpredictability into an
already dysfunctional budget process.43 As was true with the episode
involving Mayor Newsom, the chaos created by the Schwarzenegger–Chiang
conflict has no federal analogue. President Obama will likely never be in the
position of needing to sue his Treasury Secretary over policy or legal
disagreements.44 Whatever the problems may be with the way the federal
government has responded to the economic crises of the last year, internecine
battles in the Executive Branch do not appear to have been the monkey wrench
in D.C. that they seem to have been in Sacramento. Chalk up another point for
the unitary executive, at least in this fiscal management setting.
38

See, e.g., Gilb, No. 34-2008-80000026, at 13 (Cal. App. Dep’t 29 Super. Ct. Mar. 18, 2009).
Id. at 10.
40 See Schwarzenegger, No. 34-2009-900000158, at 2–3 (minute order).
41 See, e.g., Kevin Yamamura, State Controller: I Won’t Carry Out Governor’s Furlough Order,
SACRAMENTO BEE, Jan. 22, 2009, at 4A, available at http://www.sacbee.com/capitolandcalifornia/story/
1563773.html.
42 See infra notes 74–83 and accompanying text.
43 See Yamamura, supra note 41.
44 See, e.g., PAUL BREST, SANFORD LEVINSON, J.M. BALKIN & AKHIL REED AMAR, PROCESSES OF
CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING: CASES AND MATERIALS 674 (4th ed. 2000) (noting that the independence
of the Federal Reserve may raise its own problems and solutions).
39
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LESSON #2: DIVIDED IS CONQUERED? AMBITIOUS ASSERTION OF PLURAL
EXECUTIVE POWER CAN UNDERMINE THE ENTIRETY OF EXECUTIVE AUTHORITY
AND INDEPENDENCE.

A second interesting facet of the Mayor Newsom episode is the particular
way in which the California Supreme Court repudiated his actions.45
Importantly, it did so by rejecting not just local executive power, but rather all
executive power to decline to enforce state statutes.46 Thus, the state regime’s
dispersal of executive power in a way that allowed for Mayor Newsom’s
independent actions may have diminished the sum total of state executive
power relative to the amount of power under a more unitary system. Logically,
nothing dictates that divided executive powers should lead to diminished
executive powers, but it is interesting to note that many of the most ardent
proponents of a unitary executive regime at the federal level (like Justices
Scalia and Thomas) also read executive power quite broadly. It may therefore
be no coincidence that divided executive schemes incline some jurists (like
those on the California Supreme Court) to construe the totality of executive
power somewhat narrowly. Apart from all of that, as I explain below, the
aggressive maneuver undertaken by a participant in the divided executive
arena (Mayor Newsom) may have, in the short run, hurt the very cause (samesex marriage rights) he was ostensibly championing.47
To be sure, the outcome of the California Supreme Court’s appraisal of the
mayor’s decision to authorize same-sex marriage licenses in violation of state
statutes48 came as no surprise. Almost all legal commentators who were not
involved in the litigation predicted that the court would reject Newsom’s
position.49
What was less foreseeable than the high court’s decision itself, however,
was its reasoning. Exactly how would the California Supreme Court explain
its result? And exactly what—if anything—would the court say and do about
the 4,000 or so marriage licenses that San Francisco had already issued to gay
couples?
In some respects, the court’s opinion exemplified judicial restraint and care.
The court explicitly steered clear of expressing any views on the “ultimate”
45
46
47
48
49

Lockyer v. City and County of S.F., 95 P.3d 459, 459 (Cal. 2004).
Id. at 486.
See infra notes 69–72 and accompanying text.
Lockyer, 95 P.3d at 487.
E.g., Egelko, supra note 31.
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question in the California gay marriage controversy—whether the statutes that
define marriage as only between a man and a woman are consistent with
California’s constitution50 (a question later decided by the court and discussed
later in this Essay).
But in contrast to its careful avoidance of that issue, the court was quite
expansive in its discussion about the limits on executive power that made
Mayor Newsom’s actions directing the issuance of same-sex marriage licenses
untenable. In rejecting Newsom’s claim, the court could simply have said that
local executive officials who are part of a statewide hierarchical system, such
as mayors, lack such power. But in its opinion, the court did not explicitly
home in on local executive officials, and it went further to suggest that no
executive official—local or statewide—could ever have such power.51
Was the court’s seemingly broad rejection of all executive power to decline
to enforce statutes sound? Dissenting Justice Kathryn Werdegar believed that
it was not and criticized the majority’s expansive tone and language:
Under these circumstances, I see no justification for asserting a broad
claim of power over the executive branch. Make no mistake, the
majority does assert such a claim by holding that executive officers
must follow statutory rather than constitutional law until a court gives
52
them permission in advance to do otherwise.

Consider, in this regard, the court’s citation to a mid-nineteenth century
U.S. Supreme Court case for the proposition that “to contend that the
obligation imposed on the president to see the laws faithfully executed implies
a power to forbid their execution is a novel construction of the constitution,
and entirely inadmissible.”53 But history is more complicated than the
California court made out. Let us look at the founding era. While Marbury v.
Madison54 does say that “it is emphatically the province and duty of the
judicial department to say what the law is,”55 “emphatically” is not
“exclusively.” And many a president has historically, and I think properly,
asserted a power to decline to enforce a congressional statute that he believed
to be unconstitutional—a power deriving from both the oath he took to support
50

See, e.g., Lockyer, 95 P.3d at 486–87.
See, e.g., id. at 485–86, 487 (asserting that because statutes are always presumed constitutional and the
statutes at hand were not patently unconstitutional, their directives must be followed by all public officials).
52 Id. at 510 (Werdegar, J., dissenting).
53 Id. at 464 (quoting Kendall v. United States, 37 U.S. 524, 613 (1838)).
54 5 U.S. 137 (1 Cranch) (1803).
55 Id. at 177.
51
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the Constitution and his duty to see that the law, especially the Constitution, is
“faithfully executed.”56
Take, for example, the 1798 Alien and Sedition Acts, through which
Congress effectively sought to outlaw criticism of the incumbent Federalists—
an obvious First Amendment violation.57 Even though the federal courts had
upheld the Act,58 President Thomas Jefferson pardoned everyone who had
been convicted under the statute.59 To Jefferson, the question was not simply
what decisions courts had reached or might reach regarding the
constitutionality of the Act, but what his own independent constitutional
conscience dictated.
In 1832, six years before the Court decided Kendall v. United States, the
case cited by the California justices,60 President Andrew Jackson vetoed a bill
on constitutional grounds—again using independent judgment despite a prior
ruling indicating that the bill would have been judicially approved.61 There,
the Supreme Court had already upheld a similar bill against constitutional
challenge.62 But Jackson wrote:
The Congress, the Executive, and the Court must each for itself be
guided by its own opinion of the Constitution. Each public officer
who takes an oath to support the Constitution swears that he will
support it as he understands it, and not as it is understood by others.
It is as much the duty of the House of Representatives, of the Senate,
and of the President to decide upon the constitutionality of any bill or
resolution which may be presented to them for passage or approval as
it is of the supreme judges when it may be brought before them for
63
judicial decision.

More recent authority from the U.S. Supreme Court also indicates that the
President may sometimes have the power to reject or refuse to enforce a law
that he believes is unconstitutional. For instance, as then-Assistant Attorney
56

U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
See JOHN C. MILLER, CRISIS IN FREEDOM: THE ALIEN AND SEDITION ACTS 75–76 (1951) (describing
the politically-motivated Federalist congress as passing the Sedition Act to “ensure the perpetuation of their
party’s control”).
58 See id. at 129–30 (describing a federal circuit court’s jury charge that resulted in upholding the
constitutionality of the Sedition Act).
59 JAMES MAGEE, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 22 (2002).
60 See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
61 See Jonathan D. Varat, William Cohen & Vikram D. Amar, Constitutional Law: Cases and Materials
35 (13th ed. 2009).
62 Id.
63 Id.
57
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General (and later acting Solicitor General) Walter Dellinger observed in a
1994 memo, “[o]pinions dating to at least 1860 assert the President’s authority
to decline to effectuate enactments that the President views as
unconstitutional.”64 Dellinger noted that “[m]ore recently, in Freytag v.
Commissioner, all four of the Justices who addressed the issue agreed that the
President has ‘the power to veto encroaching laws . . . or even to disregard
them when they are unconstitutional.’”65
Nor are executive branch officials institutionally or practically incompetent
to perform the kind of sophisticated constitutional interpretation that would
justify executive independence and refusal to enforce statutes. The California
court observed:
Certainly attorneys have no monopoly on wisdom, but a person
trained for three years or more in a college of law and then tempered
with at least a decade of experience within the judicial system is
likely to be far better equipped to make difficult constitutional
66
judgments than a lay administrator with no background in the law.

Yet many executive officers throughout American history have been among
the most talented and insightful of constitutional lawyers. Perhaps the best
example of this is President Abraham Lincoln, who many believe was a more
sophisticated constitutional lawyer and thinker than anyone on the Supreme
Court during his day.
Moreover, the comparison between the aptitude of courts and the aptitude
of executive officials that the California court suggests we undertake is a false
one. The real comparison should be between the aptitude of the legislature that
passed the statute in question and the executive official who does not wish to
enforce it because he believes it to be unconstitutional. Legislators are no
more likely than executive officials to be learned lawyers. Yet the California
court’s broad suggestion is that all executive officials must obey statutes that
legislators think are constitutional, even though no court has yet weighed in to
support either the legislature or the executive branch positions.
For this reason, the “presumption of constitutionality”67 that attaches to
each legislative statute—and which does much work in the court’s analysis68—
64

BREST ET AL., supra note 44, at 56.
Id. (citation omitted).
66 Lockyer v. City and County of S.F., 95 P.3d 459, 490 (Cal. 2004) (quoting S. Pac. Transp. Co. v. Pub.
Utils. Comm’n, 556 P.2d 289, 321 (Cal. 1976)).
67 Id. at 493 (quoting Davies Warehouse Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 144, 153 (1944)).
65
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is itself undermined by the court’s functional analysis of the legal
sophistication of the relevant actors. There is no reason to believe that a
legislator’s instincts about what is constitutional are likely to be any better than
an executive official’s.
The California Supreme Court also ruled more broadly than necessary on
another question: Do—or did—the licenses already issued by San Francisco to
same-sex couples have any legal force and effect? The majority bluntly
responded no, holding that because the licenses were issued unlawfully, they
never had, and never will have, any effect at all.69
To some extent, the majority’s instinct was right—until and unless
California statutes defining marriage as between only a man and a woman have
been judicially invalidated, the San Francisco same-sex licenses cannot have
any legal force, and the persons who hold them cannot enjoy any of the legal
benefits distinctive to the institution of marriage. Thus, couples possessing
these licenses should know—and the California Supreme Court was right to
remind them—that these licenses should not be relied upon in the absence of a
court opinion invalidating the marriage statute.
But the court went a step further, saying that even in the event that
California marriage statutes were later invalidated by appellate courts, samesex couples would have to go through the marriage process (again) to obtain
marital benefits: “[S]hould the current California statutes limiting marriage to a
man and a woman ultimately be repealed or be held unconstitutional, the
affected couples then would be free to obtain lawfully authorized marriage
licenses.”70
Justice Werdegar’s dissent invokes a persuasive analogy to demonstrate
that the court’s conclusion here is far from obvious.71 She observes that
“interracial marriages that were void under antimiscegeny statutes at the time
they were solemnized were nonetheless recognized as valid after the high court
rejected those laws in Loving v. Virginia.”72 At the time the interracial
marriages were voided, no court had held the statutes banning interracial
marriage to be unconstitutional. Yet, as Justice Werdegar suggests, after the
Supreme Court so held, interracial marriages that had already been solemnized
68
69
70
71
72

See, e.g., id. at 485–86.
Id. at 498.
Id.
Id. at 508 (Werdegar, J., dissenting).
Id.
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were recognized automatically.73 Why should same-sex marriages be treated
differently? The majority gives no adequate answer.
LESSON #3: THE POTENTIAL DRAWBACKS OF A DIVIDED EXECUTIVE DEPEND
VERY MUCH ON THE PARTICULAR OFFICES INVOLVED IN ANY CLASH
Let us return to the Schwarzenegger–Chiang battles over the state budget.
For many reasons, the general instinct among lawyers and the population is
that Chiang’s various gambits in court should, did, and will continue to lose.
First, it is odd that the controller would believe he is legally authorized to take
positions in court contrary to the Governor’s positions. In a seminal ruling in
1981,74 the California Supreme Court held that even the attorney general could
not take a position adverse to the Governor in court because under the state
constitution, the Governor retains the “Supreme Executive power” to
determine the public interest, and under state statutes he is to “supervise the
official conduct of all executive and ministerial officers.”75 While the
controller is often designated as the state’s chief financial officer, and while he
is assigned by the constitution to sit on some meaningful boards,76 California
courts have held that the office of the controller is largely “ministerial.”77 The
job of the controller consists of being the state’s chief auditor and accountant,
but not its fiscal steward. The Governor plays that role, and, in the case of
state employment, fiscal stewardship lies in the hands of the legislatively
established Department of Personnel Administration, which the Governor
oversees. Given that even the attorney general—an officer whose job is to
litigate—is not permitted to formally sue the Governor or take legal positions
adverse to the Governor’s positions, the controller’s assertion that he may
disregard the Governor’s directives and challenge them in court seems quite
far-fetched.
It is true that some of the controller’s arguments—arguments asserted on
behalf of himself and a variety of other independently elected statewide
officers such as the treasurer and Lieutenant Governor—were ostensibly

73

Id.
People ex rel. Deukmejian v. Brown, 624 P.2d 1206 (Cal. 1981).
75 Id. at 1209.
76 See LARRY BERMAN, BRUCE ALLEN MURPHY & MILTON CLARKE, APPROACHING DEMOCRACY:
CALIFORNIA EDITION 712–13 (5th ed. 2005).
77 See, e.g., Tirapelle v. Davis, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d 666, 676 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (“[T]he greater part of the
duties devolved upon [the Controller] are of a . . . purely ministerial character.” (quoting People ex rel
McCauley v. Brooks, 16 Cal. 11, 55 (1860))).
74
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asserted to protect the independence of the office of the controller and the
employees housed within it rather than simply based on disagreements with the
Governor about general policy.78 But even if the controller had standing to
raise those arguments about the independence of his office—in the way that
the President sometimes declines to defend Congress’s laws that impinge upon
the Executive Branch79—that rationale would not justify the bulk of the
controller’s legal arguments. These arguments focused on his disagreement
with the Governor over which resolution to the budget crisis was in the state’s
best interest, disagreements he had with the Governor over the meaning of
federal law—questions on which even the attorney general is supposed to defer
to the Governor under the ruling in People ex rel. Deukmejian v. Brown80—
and questions about the feasibility of various payment methods,81 which again
are matters of pure policy and executive implementation squarely within
gubernatorial competence.
Related to and perhaps as important as this “structural”82 critique of the
need for controller independence is the political reality that, as compared to the
Governor, the controller hardly even counts as a prominent statewide elected
official. This is evidenced by the fact that voter interest in the unknown
candidates’ statewide race for controller is virtually nil,83 and the amount of
money spent on the controller race pales in comparison with the amount spent

78

See, e.g., Schwarzenegger v. Chiang, No. 34-2009-80000158-CU-WM-GDS, at 2–3 (Cal. Super. Ct.
County of Sacramento Mar. 12, 2009) (minute order).
79 Cf. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
80 People ex rel. Deukmejian v. Brown, 624 P.2d 1206, 1209 (Cal. 1981) (“The constitutional pattern is
crystal clear: if a conflict between the Governor and the Attorney General develops over the faithful execution
of the laws of this state, the Governor retains the ‘supreme executive power’ to determine the public interest;
the Attorney General may act only ‘subject to the powers’ of the Governor.” (quoting CAL. CONST. art. V,
§ 13)).
81 Gilb v. Chiang, No. 34-2008-80000026, at 10–13 (Cal. App. Dep’t 29 Super. Ct. Feb. 27, 2009) (ruling
after hearing). See also, e.g., Yamamura, supra note 41.
82 I borrow this term from Bill Marshall, who uses it to describe an approach that “focuses on the
respective roles of . . . officers in the divided executive and questions which role deserves particular deference
in a specific context.” See William P. Marshall, Break Up the Presidency? Governors, State Attorneys
General, and Lessons from the Divided Executive, 115 YALE L.J. 2446, 2464 (2006).
83 See, e.g., MARK DICAMILLO & MERVIN FIELD, THE FIELD INST., THE FIELD POLL: AWARENESS, IMAGE
RATINGS AND PREFERENCE MEASUREMENTS IN SEVEN DOWN BALLOT STATEWIDE ELECTION CONTESTS 5
(2002) (showing that considerably more than half of voters surveyed had “no opinion” about either major party
candidate for the controller office); Allison Hoffman, Candidates for Controller Struggling for Attention,
TORRANCE DAILY BREEZE, Oct. 29, 2006, at A6; Matthew Yi, CAMPAIGN 2006: State Controller; Unknowns
Clash in Battle to Claim Powerful State Financial Position, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 14, 2006, at B2 (observing that
more than eighty percent of voters had no opinion of either major party candidate for controller in the weeks
leading up to election).
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on the gubernatorial race.84 Moreover, the fiscal and budgetary management
policies of gubernatorial candidates are prominent during the election, whereas
the controller’s platforms tend to be more technical, and citizen awareness of
the identity of any statewide executive office other than the Governor and the
attorney general seems to be exceedingly low. While a substantial majority of
people know who the Governor is, and over half the voters typically have an
opinion regarding attorney general candidates in election polls, generally no
other statewide official is recognized by more than twenty percent of the
populace.85 The controller’s office is so under-the-radar that it has not even
been included in the most prominent surveys of voter knowledge conducted
over the years.
In short, the idea that in a time of true fiscal calamity (and the last year has
certainly been calamitous)86 a clash of policy between the Governor and a
controller in California should warrant judicial resolution, which would result
in delaying certainty about the course of fiscal action to be pursued, is
laughable. And yet this is an entailment of California’s distinctive scheme of
divided executive powers (one of the many areas of fiscal management that
cries out for reform in the state). There seems to be very little modern
justification for a separately elected state controller, let alone one who can
claim any legitimate authority to challenge the Governor’s sense of what is in
the best fiscal interests of the public. I am not suggesting, of course, that the
Governor should be treated as an emperor in times of financial emergency; he
must obey existing laws, contracts, and federal limitations. What I am saying
is that those laws, contracts, and federal limitations can be enforced by courts
in lawsuits brought by aggrieved employees and citizens. The office of the
controller need not confuse and complicate things more by asserting its own
(often poorly reasoned) views in court.
Contrast the Governor–controller conflict with the tension that sometimes
exists between the attorney general (the state’s chief legal officer) and the
Governor. As the thoughtful constitutional scholar William Marshall suggests
in one of the few significant essays looking at divided state executive branches

84

See Yi, supra note 83 (documenting that both major party candidates had, only two months before the
election, raised only around $1 million). A campaign for the Governor’s office in California can easily require
more than $50 million.
85 See, e.g., MARK BALDASSARE ET AL., PUB. POLICY INST. OF CAL, CALIFORNIANS AND THEIR
GOVERNMENT 19 (1999).
86 See supra notes 33–36 and accompanying text.

AMAR GALLEYSFINAL

2009]

LESSONS FROM CALIFORNIA’S RECENT EXPERIENCE

5/3/2010 10:30 AM

487

and the lessons they may offer for the federal model,87 many states have a
strong tradition of attorney general independence. Even in California, where
the state supreme court held that the attorney general may not sue or “take a
position adverse to”88 the Governor, the California Supreme Court has read
state statutes broadly (perhaps overly so) to recognize the attorney general’s
power to decline to assert a position desired by the Governor (or other
executive branch clients) and bow out of the case entirely, leaving it to the
Governor’s office or other executive agency to assert its legal views on its
own.89 Thus, while the attorney general may not contradict the Governor, he
need not be the Governor’s mouthpiece if he feels required by his legal
conscience, and his desire to keep his legal hands clean, to disagree with the
chief executive.
In California, the unfolding gay marriage episode showcased this
independence of the attorney general.90 After the California Supreme Court
repudiated Mayor Newsom’s actions,91 it then heard the state constitutional
equal protection–due process challenge to California’s statutes limiting
marriage to opposite-sex couples on the merits.92 In these California same-sex
marriage cases,93 Attorney General Jerry Brown filed a brief that differed from
the Governor’s position on the merits, asserting different nuanced views of
state equal protection.94 Technically, this independent view might have run
afoul of the Brown decision—the attorney general’s position was different
from and arguably adverse to the Governor’s stance.95 The “clean hands”
rationale allowing an attorney general to decline to represent a client he thinks
is acting illegally would not seem to justify the attorney general’s decision to
file separately.
87

See Marshall, supra note 82.
People ex rel. Deukmejian v. Brown, 624 P.2d 1206, 1209 (Cal. 1981).
89 Id. at 1209. The court read California Government Code Section 11040 as recognizing the attorney
general’s prerogative to withdraw from representation of an executive agency, even though the statute’s terms
do not explicitly confer that power. Id.
90 Ironically, the attorney general is now Jerry Brown, who was the Governor in 1981 when he was
challenged by then-Attorney General George Duekmejian in the dispute that led to the 1981 Brown ruling in
favor of the Governor. Id.
91 Lockyer v. City and County of S.F., 95 P.3d 459, 459 (Cal. 2004).
92 In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008).
93 Id.
94 Answer Brief in Response to Petition for Extraordinary Relief, In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384
(Cal. 2008) (No. S147999).
95 Although the differences in the positions asserted are minor, the Governor’s lawyer (who argued
separately from the Attorney General’s Office at oral argument) did advert to differences in legal views.
Transcript of Oral Argument at 54–56, In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008) (No. S147199).
88
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It is possible, of course, that the Governor authorized or encouraged the
attorney general to make a distinct filing. Perhaps the Governor thought the
court was best served by having multiple approaches to equal protection
briefed before it. But there does not seem to be a public record of such
approval, creating at least the possibility of attorney general independence that
is even stronger than that recognized as legitimate by the California courts.
Professor Marshall argues that the tradition of attorney general
independence from governors is beneficial and is explained in large part by a
structural analysis of the job of a top lawyer.96 Governors are not typically
elected for their legal—as opposed to policy, managerial, or fiscal—prowess,
so recognizing latitude by state attorneys general makes good democratic
sense. Such a structural account seems to explain the instinct in California that
the attorney general’s independence is more understandable than that of the
controller, although both are elected officials.97 And history shows that
formal, legal independence does not confer real world credibility and authority
as much as political or structural running room does. Prosecutors appointed
by, and subject to removal by, the President often have more real world
credibility and clout than so-called “independent” prosecutors, who by virtue
of their selection process may be legally protected from termination but are
vulnerable to the charge of political gamesmanship.
Even if Professor Marshall is correct that state attorneys general do and
should enjoy independence from their governors, the recent California
experience again counsels caution in some respects. In the most recent phase
of the California gay marriage saga, after the voters of the state reinstated a ban
on same-sex marriage,98 a federal lawsuit was filed challenging the state ban
on federal grounds. So far, the attorney general has declined to defend the
state law and again has gone beyond a “clean hands” approach to formally
attack the law99 (as he had done in the most recent battles over state law
grounds). The Governor, who has made a number of separate filings, has
declined to weigh in on the merits of the case, saying that he lacks a basis for

96

Marshall, supra note 82, at 2464–67.
It does bear noting that at election time the attorney general is a much more salient and visible office
and one about which voters have many more views and opinions.
98 For a discussion of the federal challenge, see Dan Levine, Prop 8 Backers Don’t Want to Give Up Email, RECORDER (S.F., Cal.), Sept. 28, 2009.
99 See Answer of Attorney General Edmund G. Brown Jr. at 3, 8–10, Perry v. Schwarzenegger, No. 09CV-02292 VRW (N.D. Cal. June 12, 2009) (asserting that Proposition 8 violates the federal Constitution).
97
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responding to the plaintiff’s legal arguments.100
While politically
understandable, the Governor’s assertion that he is not in a position to weigh in
makes little legal sense. Does he agree with the attorney general’s refusal to
defend (and decision to attack) the state law? If so, why doesn’t he make that
clear? If not, what is his position? As the district court judge handling the
case has observed, it is odd—and frustrating—that the Governor refuses to
state his views on this most important of modern legal issues.101 Even if a
divided executive were to accomplish some laudable goal of checks and
balances, surely clarity about how divided the executive is—and how much we
can infer about the Governor’s views from what the attorney general files—
would promote the undeniably important accountability102 the unitary
executive theory tries to vindicate.
LESSON (OR QUESTION) #4: CAN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT LEARN FROM
THE CALIFORNIA ATTORNEY GENERAL’S DISINCLINATION TO DEFEND THE
BAN ON SAME-SEX MARRIAGES?
I close this Essay not with a lesson, but with a question. Might scholars of
the federal model learn from the example set by the California attorney general
in the gay marriage context, where he failed to defend a state law against a
constitutional challenge? As many (including Marty Lederman, whom I quote
here) have pointed out:
As a general matter, the [federal Justice] Department has traditionally
adhered to a policy of defending the constitutionality of federal
enactments whenever “reasonable” arguments can be made in support
of such statutes—i.e., whenever the constitutionality of the law is not
fairly precluded by clear constitutional language or governing
Supreme Court case law. This practice has been predicated on the
notion that because the political branches—the Congress that voted
for the law and the President who signed it—have already concluded
that the statute was constitutional, it would be inappropriate for DOJ

100 See Administration’s Answer to Complaint for Declaratory, Injunctive, or Other Relief, Perry v.
Schwarzenegger, No. 09-CV-02292 VRW (N.D. Cal. June 16, 2009).
101 Lisa Leff, Judge Sets January Trial Date for Prop. 8 Case, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Aug. 19, 2009 (noting
Judge Vaughn Walker’s “pointed advice for the lawyer who was in court representing Gov. Arnold
Schwarzenegger,” and that the judge “was surprised to find Schwarzenegger standing on the sidelines ‘on an
issue of this magnitude and importance,’” and that the judge observed that “[t]he Governor’s thoughts and
views would be very much welcome and appreciated”).
102 Cf. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992); see also Perdue v. Baker, 586 S.E.2d 606, 609
(Ga. 2003) (suggesting Georgia may favor a “concurrent power” approach to legal representation).
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lawyers to take it upon themselves to reject the constitutional
103
judgment shared by the President and the legislature.

Although there are exceptions to this rule (involving, as noted above,
situations where a law allegedly impinges on the Executive Branch or where
the President has already publicly committed to not enforcing a law), there is a
strong federal tradition of the Executive Branch defending the constitutionality
of statutes. Although he has not made clear his reasoning, California’s
Attorney General Brown must not embrace this approach. Like the federal
Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), which the Obama Administration is
defending in court, the California ban on same-sex marriages can be legally
defended by non-frivolous arguments. Indeed, they are, at least under current
case law, likely to be winning arguments.
Some might urge Attorney General Brown to more thoroughly explain his
disinclination to defend the statute. But I would urge the federal Department
of Justice (DOJ) to explain more thoroughly its decision to defend in virtually
all cases. What exactly makes it more important to safeguard against
separation of powers violations than, say, equal protection violations? And
why is the President’s stance so different in litigation than in legislation? After
all, the President need not give much interpretive deference to Congress when
deciding whether to veto a law. Why should the Administration be more
solicitous of Congress’s handiwork in court? Indeed, as noted above,
presidents sometimes decline to enforce federal statutes, a position that would
seem more extreme than a refusal to legally defend a statute. But should DOJ
necessarily be more reluctant to refuse to defend than to refuse to enforce a
statute? It is not clear.
There are a number of possible distinctions between Attorney General
Brown’s decision to attack Proposition 8 and the Obama Administration’s
decision to defend DOMA. First, Proposition 8 is a voter initiative, not a
statute. But since Attorney General Brown’s objection to Proposition 8 is
substantive, and does not relate to whether the Proposition went through the
requisite procedural hoops to become a part of the state constitution, that
distinction may not be relevant. Second, Attorney General Brown is elected,
and the federal Attorney General Eric Holder is not. But President Obama is
elected, and he could instruct his Attorney General not to defend the DOMA if
103 Marty Lederman, John Roberts and the SG’s Refusal to Defend Federal Statutes in Metro
Broadcasting v. FCC, BALKINIZATION (Sept. 8, 2005, 00:11), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2005/09/john-robertsand-sgs-refusal-to-defend.html.
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he chose. Also, as noted earlier, even if a state attorney general were not
elected, his independence might not be drastically reduced. Third, state
standing rules permit more parties and intervenors, such that a state attorney
general’s attack, or refusal to defend, might not impair the ability of the court
to hear the strongest defense of the law in state court as much as in federal
courts, which are more stringent about standing and other justiciability
doctrines. Perhaps this is true, but these federal doctrines might not be as rigid
as they sometimes appear. Further, Congress is able to assert its own defense
of federal statutes if it chooses.104
Lastly, I should note one significant similarity between the Proposition 8
and DOMA litigations—they both involve core equal protection challenges to
statutes. Attorney General Brown points out in his federal court Proposition 8
brief that his attack on, rather than defense of, the measure finds precedent in
another California equal protection case that was filed in the federal courts—
the discriminatory housing case of Reitman v. Mulkey105 in which state
officials attacked the state law under challenge. Moving to the federal, as
opposed to state, DOJ, one of the early cases in which the federal DOJ
declined to defend a federal law also involved a core “separate but equal”
Fourteenth Amendment issue.106 Perhaps if additions are to be made to the list
of situations in which the federal DOJ should decline to defend federal statutes,
they should build on an equal protection base, like the one used in California.

104

See Note, Executive Discretion and the Congressional Defense of Statutes, 92 YALE L.J. 970 (1983).
387 U.S. 369 (1967).
106 See Simkins v. Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp., 211 F. Supp. 628 (M.D.N.C. 1962), rev’d 323 F.2d 959
(4th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 938 (1964).
105

